The European Strategy for the Middle East. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 4, No. 19, December 2004 by Alvarino, Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio.
 
 
   
   
                                                                             Robert Schuman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The European Strategy for the Middle East
 
-Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño
 
 
 
 
 
Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 4   No. 19  
December 2004
  
This publication is sponsored by the EU Commission.   
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in 
cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer 
of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the 
European Union.  While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the 
European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its 
objectives at home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, 
the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process.  In order for efficiency and progress to 
prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of 
this organization.  As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze 
various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How did the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to 
understand each other?  Under what conditions? 
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
 
Miami European Union Center        Jean Monnet Chair Staff: 
University  of  Miami      Joaquín  Roy  (Director) 
1000  Memorial  Drive      Aimee  Kanner  (Editor) 
101 Ferré Building           Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant) 
Coral Gables, Fl. 33124-2231        Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant) 
Phone:  305-284-3266; Fax: 305-284-4406    Markus Thiel (Research Assistant) 
Email:  jroy@miami.edu    Wendy  Grenade  (Associate  Editor) 
Web:  www.miami.edu/eucenter     Eloisa  Vladescu  (Editorial  Assistant) 
  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
The European Strategy for the Middle East 
  _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio Alvariño* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Jean Monnet Chair 
University of Miami 
Miami, Florida 
December 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
______ 
* Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies in the University of Alicante. He has published several books 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  –El proceso de paz de Oriente Medio (Madrid, 1999), El miedo a la paz (Madrid, 
2001), edited the volume Informe del conflicto de Palestina. De los Acuerdos de Oslo a el Road Map (Madrid, 
2003) and co-edited España y la cuestión palestina (Madrid, 2003). 
 
  
 
 
1
 
THE EUROPEAN STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
  
 
The Iraq crisis has not only highlighted the absence of a cohesive European foreign policy, but 
has also revealed that European countries are unable to agree on what issues should be given 
priority by EU action. The establishment of a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) is one of the biggest challenges currently faced by the EU.  
 
  A common EU strategy for the Middle East is pivotal to the CFSP, given the fact that 
numerous international conflicts stem from this area: the upsurge of Islamic terrorism, instability 
in Iraq, or the failure of the peace process. European countries agree with the United States on 
the need to maintain stability in the region, to foster political and economic change, and to grant 
oil supply at reasonable prices. However, the EU and the United States are split in their position 
towards how to reach their goals. 
 
  A growing unilateralism has been the trademark of the US administration’s foreign 
policy since President George W. Bush came to power. This policy has had a negative impact on 
the US transatlantic partnership. Even though the EU and the United States have made a similar 
analysis of the current situation in the Middle East, they argue over what measures to take in the 
coming years: While Washington advocates a merciless war on terrorism based on American 
military supremacy, Brussels calls for the need to consider the social, political and economic side 
to the problem as well. 
 
  As the weaknesses of Bush Administration’s unilateralism have come to the foreground, 
transatlantic relations have slightly improved, the G-8 Summit held at Sea Island in June 8-10
th 
2004 being an indicator of this rapprochement. The March-11 terrorist attacks in Madrid have 
proved that al Qaeda does not differentiate between enemies, but is able to operate both in the 
United States and the EU. Furthermore, the Road Map and the Greater Middle East initiatives 
reveal that, despite transatlantic differences, there are common strategies to face future 
challenges. 
 
  This paper aims to answer several questions: Will March-11 bring the UE and US closer 
together? Does the EU have a clear-cut strategy for post-war Iraq? Does the Road Map amount 
to a new formula of transatlantic cooperation? Can the Greater Middle East initiative be 
successful provided that a close cooperation between Europeans and Americans takes place? 
Answering these questions will allow us to argue that a distinct European strategy for the Middle 
East does exist, although it lacks the means to be implemented on-the-spot. 
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The Islamic Challenge: From the American S-11 to the European M-11 
 
The Madrid terrorist attack, in which 190 people died, highlighted the fact that the US was not 
the only target of Islamic terrorism. The chosen date, exactly two years and a half after S-11, was 
rampantly symbolic. Authorship was claimed by al Qaeda through the Abu Hafs the Egyptian 
Brigades (Kata´ib Abu Hafs al-Masri). According to the report the “Trains of Death”, featured in 
the Arabic journal Al-Quds al-`Arabi on March 12, 2004, the operation was carried out in 
revenge for Spain’s involvement in the Iraq war. The text, pervaded with religious references, 
threatened with further attacks, since the bombs were simply “part of the settling of old scores 
with Crusading Spain, now an American ally in the battle against Islam.” Police investigation 
then led to the Moroccan Fighting Islamic Group (Yama`a Islamiyya Muyahida fi-l-Magreb), 
one of the Maghrebi jihadist organizations linked with al Qaeda. 
 
  March-11 revitalized the EU’s previous commitment to fight terrorism. Yet, the EU 
warned that, in spite of having the same goals as the US, the question of the causes of radical 
Islamism was of crucial importance for its eradication. A distinct European position was adopted 
at three meetings: the Brussels Summit on September 21 2001, the Laeken Declaration in 
December 15 that same year and, finally, the European Security Strategy in December 12, 2003. 
Ten days after September-11, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting in Brussels 
claiming that “the fight against terrorism demands a greater cooperation of the Union with the 
international community to prevent and stabilize regional conflicts”. The Brussels Summit also 
stated that “the integration of all countries worldwide in a system granting security, prosperity 
and development is of fundamental importance for the establishment of a strong and lasting 
community to fight terrorism.”  
 
  Three months later, the Laeken Declaration over the future of Europe, adopted by the 
European Council at a meeting held in December 14-15 2001, put forward a number of guiding 
principles for the European fight against Islamic terrorism: “The eleventh of September has 
brought a rude awakening. […]  The role it [Europe] has to play is that of a power resolutely 
doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind 
eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of 
world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power 
seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity 
and sustainable development.” 
 
  Finally, the European Security Strategy, adopted in December 12 2003, polished up the 
two former declarations and underlined the need to develop a European security policy clearly 
distinct from the American stance. In a newspaper article, Javier Solana, head of the CFSP, 
stated that such strategy “was born when Europeans acknowledged that we are stronger when we 
have a common perception of the threats and how to deal with them. This is true not only for 
Europe but also for the trans-Atlantic community and for the international community as a 
whole”.
1 For Mr. CFSP, the Middle East is pivotal to the European security strategy: “In our 
                     
1 Javier Solana, "Joining Forces Against New Threats", International Herald Tribune, December 12, 2003.  
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immediate neighborhood, Europe shoulders a growing responsibility for security in the Balkans. 
But the challenge of building regional security extends further - beyond our new borders to the 
East and to the Arab world […]. Closer engagement with the Arab world must also be a priority. 
Without resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there will be little chance of dealing with other 
problems in a region”.  
 
  According to Solana, it was essential to investigate the sources of international conflicts, 
instead of simply dealing with their consequences: “Our strategy of preventive engagement goes 
beyond the immediate threats to take account of the environment in which those threats are 
generated. […] Many regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity, sickness and poverty. 
In short, a world fairer is a world more secure […]. Military capabilities are an important 
element in our strategy, but there are others. Military efficiency has often been followed by 
civilian chaos. We need police and other civilian capabilities in crisis and post-crisis situations”.  
  
  While the EU regarded it essential to strengthen international institutions and to promote 
multilateralism, the US advocated a stronger unilateralism to fight Islamic terrorism. In 
September 2002, one year after the S-11 massacre, the Bush administration put forward “The 
National Security Strategy”, which mentioned the possibility to launch preventive wars against 
“emerging threats before they are fulfilled.”
2 The first step in the universal war against terrorism 
was the so-called “Axis of Evil”, consisting of Iraq, Iran and North Korea, rogue states accused 
of developing weapons of mass destruction. 
 
  Thus, a bipolar discourse was taken up again to distinguish between a free world, ruled 
by democracy and market economy, and a string of totalitarian countries which posed a threat to 
world stability due to their alleged involvement with international terrorism. According to “The 
National Security Strategy” it was the US’s goal to "expand the circle of development by 
opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy". The achievement of this goal 
would require “a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and 
our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. 
Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations 
with other states, and respect for human dignity.” 
 
  The notion of “American internationalism” put forward by the Bush Administration 
actually concealed the unilateral measures they planned to take in the future outside the 
framework of the international community and the United Nations, as would later be shown in 
Iraq. The policy of “with us or against us”, made popular by George W. Bush since 2001, was 
just the last link in a chain of refusals to cooperate with multilateral channels: the Kyoto 
Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapon Convention, the Convention 
of Children’s Rights or the Durban Conference against racism. 
 
  Furthermore, the American Strategy for National Security and the European Security 
                     
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html  
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Strategy are not easy to reconcile with each other because they offer different remedies to deal 
with the same disease. Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, has stated: 
"American unilateralism prevents the US - truly the indispensable nation - from developing the 
proper tools for a better world order based on international cooperation […]. One major task still 
remains, namely clearing the air between Europe and the US, with the rift between them 
deepening after September 11 due to the Bush administration's brash unilateralism. The essence 
of the rift is the following: Europe is currently on a journey toward a quasi-federal pan-Europe, 
and is positing its security and the new world order on international law […].  It is the US, 
which, unlike European countries, lacks the history of a classic nation-state, which is stressing, 
after September 11, America's claim for national sovereignty and freedom to make independent 
decisions, versus Europe's aspiration for a world order founded on international cooperation and 
binding rules for all.”
3 
 
  It may be argued that, despite the similarities with September 11, the events of March 11 
did not bring the EU and the US closer together. Rather, they sounded the depth of the rift 
between both sides of the Atlantic when it comes to confront Islamic terrorism. As Professor 
Carlos Closa Montero points out: "On the whole, the coalition of support for the Bush 
administration’s current foreign policy is weakening because it was not built on solid 
foundations. The existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had not been conclusively 
proved and, as a result, for lack of a specific United Nations resolution justifying the invasion, 
the intervention ordered by the Bush administration is illegal and illegitimate. Little by little, the 
governments of the EU are coming to a consensus on this point, which means the emergence of a 
generally accepted position. This does not mean, however, a weakening of the transatlantic link. 
Rather, it simply means that the link is unviable if based on unilateral positions supported by ad 
hoc allies in opposition to other European countries.”
4 
 
The European Strategy for Post-War Iraq 
 
Besides causing transatlantic relations to go through one of its worst phases in history, the Iraq 
crisis has also highlighted the lack of a shared approach to military action among EU member 
countries. This rift led Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence, to divide Europe into two 
factions: a New Europe ―made up of the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Poland, 
Hungary, Denmark and the Czech Republic― and an Old Europe ―made up of France, 
Germany, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg, the founders of the European project― likely to be 
replaced by the former group in the near future. 
 
  The New Europe endorsed the policies of the Bush administration and agreed with the 
                     
3 Sholomo Ben-Ami, “9/11: One Year Later", The Jerusalem Post, September 6, 2002. 
4 Carlos Closa Montero, "Del 11-S al 11-M: el papel de España en la Unión Europea", Análisis del Real 
Instituto Elcano de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales, nº 46/2004.  
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need to overthrow Sadam Hussein in order to preserve world stability. The Old Europe, 
however, was reluctant to military action and favoured the solution of the problem through 
diplomatic channels.  
 
  It is worth remarking that most European citizens, regardless of faction, radically 
opposed the war, as the mass demonstrations taking place in the main European capitals showed. 
Recent European history played a key role in this trend. As Professor Phillip H. Gordon points 
out: "After 50 years of integration and the overcoming of past enmity, Europeans have also come 
to place more faith in diplomacy and cooperation than Americans, whose lessons of the Cold 
War include a greater respect for the need to threaten or use military force."
5 
 
  The position of the New Europe leaders was explained in an unprecedented declaration 
titled “United We Stand”. Published in different media, this declaration advocated the 
reinforcement of transatlantic relations and the strengthening of the Washington alliance. In 
order to justify their alignment, European leaders summoned up the American contribution to 
free the old continent from Nazism and communism. Moreover, the declaration echoed the 
American belief in the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq: "We know that 
success in the day-to-day battle against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction demands unwavering determination and firm international cohesion on the part of all 
countries for whom freedom is precious. The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction 
represent a clear threat to world security".  
 
  On May 1, 2003, six weeks after attacks were launched, Iraq was conquered by the 
Anglo-American troops, and President George W. Bush announced the official end of war, 
which did not mean the end of hostilities. Actually, the evidence used to justify the invasion was 
questioned and the absence of the “smouldering gun” was highlighted: the weapons of mass 
destruction were never found, and neither were the mobile laboratories that, according to Collin 
Powell, allegedly ran along Iraqi highways. The committee in charge of investigating the S-11 
attacks was unable to demonstrate the connection between Sadam Hussein and al Qaedar either. 
It was equally proved that the reports of the British intelligence services on Iraq’s capability to 
perpetrate attacks with chemical weapons in just 45 minutes had been selfishly overstated by the 
Blair government. 
 
  The utopian belief in a domino effect thanks to which a democratic and free Iraq would 
become a role model for the neighbouring countries and, more specifically, for the ever 
troublesome Syrian and Iranian regimes, seems to have been reversed. It is instability and 
disorder that have eventually spread throughout the Middle East. Far from consolidating a 
progressive and liberal drive, the Anglo-American stance is jeopardizing the most moderate 
sectors and strengthening the most radical ones. As Fawaz Gerges, Head of the Middle East 
Studies Programme in Sarah Lawrence College, states: “The wisdom in Washington was that the 
                     
5 Philip H. Gordon, "The Crisis in the Alliance", Iraq Memo no. 11, The Brookings Institution, February 24, 
2003.  
 
 
6
 
war would bring democracy into Iraq, democratize and transform the Muslim Middle East and 
empower those liberal voices who look to the U.S. We were also told that the war would strike at 
the roots of militancy and terrorism in the Muslim Middle East. But far from empowering the 
liberal voices the war is already radicalizing Arab politics and providing ammunition to anti-
western, anti-liberal, anti-reformist voices. By deepening the sense of the humiliation and defeat 
felt by Arab youth a constituency that presents more than 55 percent of the Arab population, the 
war will likely make this constituency a fertile recruiting ground for militant causes like that of 
al-Qaeda.”
6 
 
  An editorial in the newspaper al-Quds al-`Arabi warned about the paradox underlying 
Bush administration’s policy, one backed by the New Europe. Whereas their goal was 
supposedly to build a safer world and to consolidate democracy in the Middle East, the results 
could not have been more worrying. In the words of Arab journalist Abd al-Bari `Atwan, 
“President Bush promised the world would be safer after the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow 
of Sadam Hussein; his allies envisaged that the war against terrorism would be successful and 
would weaken al Qaeda, turning Afghanistan into a model of prosperity, well-being and 
democracy. Time has nonetheless proved them wrong. Violence has escalated within and outside 
Iraq since the invasion, as the attacks against the Istanbul mosques and the train stations in 
Madrid have shown."
7  
 
  The rift between the Old and the New Europe is symptomatic of the harmful impact the 
Iraq crisis has had on the EU. Member countries have been unable to have a common approach 
to the crisis, thus showing the limitations of the CFSP. To quote Professors Giacomo Luciani y 
Felix Neugart, "the Iraq crisis has proven once more that there is no common vision, no shared 
approach to many international problems and threats among EU member countries, which is the 
indispensable base for any coherent foreign policy. A common EU approach on Iraq may kick-
start a more comprehensive approach for the Middle East."
8 
 
  The lack of an EU-wide foreign policy does not mean that the EU is out of the debate 
over the future of Iraq. In fact, as soon as the war was over, the EU set in motion emergency 
mechanisms to grant the effective provision of humanitarian aid, and contributed to a fund to 
kick-start reconstruction. Between May 2003 and May 2004, the EU created a 305 million euro 
fund to be distributed in the following way: humanitarian aid in 2003 (100 millions), 
reconstruction aid in the period 2003-4 (200 millions), and the support of the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (3 million euros). In the Donors Conference held at Madrid in 
May 23 and 24 2003, the EU contributed with 1 250 million euros to the reconstruction of Iraq.  
                     
6 http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/03/sp_iraq_gerges040303.htm 
7 "Tafjirat Madrid al-damawiyya", Al-Quds al-`Arabi, March 13, 2004. 
8 Giacomo Luciani and Felix Neugart, "Toward a European Strategy for Iraq", Policy Paper, Bertelsmann 
Foundation, March 2003.  
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  The passing of resolution 1 511 by the Security Council legitimised the American 
presence in post-Sadam Iraq, and called for the strengthening of the UN’s role. Later, resolution 
1 546, approved on June 6, 2004, confirmed the full devolution of powers to the new Iraqi 
administration. One of the Old Europe’s demands was thus met: that the Iraqi people should 
regain their sovereignty as soon as possible. The passing of these resolutions, which had German 
and French support, shows that both the US and the EU think they should overcome their former 
transatlantic differences and become involved in seeking solutions for the Iraq crisis. 
 
  As in the Middle East peace process, the roles of the EU and the US should complement 
each other. It should not be forgotten that generally, “the UE is much more active and influential 
in times and areas of peace than in periods of conflicts and strife.”
9 The reconstruction and 
normalization of Iraq are the EU’s top priorities in the Middle East. The Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, dated June 9, 2004, entitled "The 
European Union and Iraq. A Framework for Engagement" underlined that “the EU has 
substantial interests in working with Iraq to re-build its political and legal institutions, reform its 
economy and revitalise civil society.”
10 
 
  The EU could contribute to the Iraq’s stabilisation in several ways, although its sphere of 
influence is much smaller than that of the US. Firstly, European action could act as intermediary 
between the Arab world and Washington, given the fact that both Europeans and Arabs question 
"the aggressive attitudes of the US, its black-and-white view of the world, its callousness, and 
the negative effects of globalization."
11 Secondly, the UE should struggle for Iraq’s regaining 
full sovereignty as soon as possible, and avoid using the instability argument to legitimize 
foreign military presence sine die. Thirdly, the EU should offer to share its expertise in designing 
economic models, since the establishment of a free market zone is one of the essential 
                     
9 Ghassan Salamé, “Torn between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Europe and the Middle East in the post-
Cold War Era” in The Middle East and Europe. The Power Deficit,” B. A. Roberson (ed.), (Londres, Routledge, 
1998) 40. 
10 Featuring prominently among the main medium-term objectives are the following: 1) "a political transition to 
establish a stable, pluralistic democracy, underpinned by a constitution which guarantees respect for the rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms"; 2) "promotion of economic growth and diversification, reduce poverty 
and unemployment and improved living condition standards for the Iraqi population. A functioning, competitive 
and diversified market economy, the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and Iraq’s economic integration into its 
region will help […] reduce Iraq’s susceptibility to external shocks"; 3) "Iraq’s contribution to security and stability 
in the region […]. An Iraq at peace with its neighbours and its region will also contribute to the realisation of the 
objectives set out in the European Security Strategy"; and 4) "establishment of a fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory legal framework in Iraq". In order to achieve these goals, the EU thinks it is essential to maintain 
Iraq’s territorial integrity and to guarantee internal security.  
11 Riad al Khouri, "A New Arab Coalition for a New Order, Dialog, and Peace: Regional Actors", Workshop A 
New Arab Coalition for Dialogue and Peace, Bertelsmann Foundation & Fundación de las Tres Culturas, Sevilla, 
May 8-10 2003.  
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requirements for granting security in the Gulf region in the future. This market zone would 
privilege common over selfish interests, as in post- World War II Europe. 
 
The European Role in the Road Map 
 
One of the priorities of the European strategy for the Middle East is to solve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, whose growing deterioration jeopardizes regional stability and fuels Islamic groups. 
Although the United States and the EU advocate a shared approach to the conflict, Washington 
continues to support Israel unconditionally, whereas the EU will only endorse those agreements 
which preserve the national rights of Palestinians.  
 
  During the Oslo decade, there was a certain Euro-American cooperation regarding this 
problem. The EU would be responsible for the economic cost of the peace process, while the US 
would manage political negotiations. Yet this task-sharing had its limitations since “the EU, 
although an economic power, lacks the ability to project the military power of its member-states, 
and with the existing structure of the international market it has been unable to translate its 
economic power into real political influence.”
12  
 
  Besides threatening regional stability, the lack of an Arab-Israeli peace plan questions the 
EU’s Euro-Mediterranean strategy. The 1995 Barcelona Conference aimed at laying the 
foundations for cooperation across the Mediterranean, and stirring a debate on political, security, 
economic, cultural, and human matters. The Barcelona process was soon undermined by the 
Oslo process since, for Arab states, an agreement based on the “peace for territories” principle 
was a prerequisite for talks with Israel. The collapse of the Oslo process had a direct impact on 
the Barcelona process, polluting it and arresting its natural development.  
 
  In view of the failure of Camp David negotiations and the beginning of the Aqsa Intifada, 
the EU tried to take more action in Israeli-Palestinian relations by participating in the Madrid 
Quartet, which also included the United States, UN and Russia. The creation of this Quartet 
exposes the limitations of the Oslo formula and the pax americana. The Quartet, in the words of 
Miguel Angel Moratinos, Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs, would be the United States’ 
attempt “to change the working methodology and try to share the heavy burden of Middle 
Eastern mediation with other international actors.”
13 The EU’s participation in the Quartet 
should mark an advance in the complementarities of European and American postures and 
should reaffirm the EU’s role as a “strategic actor” in contrast to the low political profile kept 
throughout the first stage of the Oslo process. The EU should counterbalance the US position via 
its long-standing support for “a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State on the basis of 
                     
12 B. A. Roberson (ed.), The Middle East and Europe. The Power Deficit, (Londres, Routledge, 1998)  11. 
13 Miguel Ángel Moratinos, "El Cuarteto de Oriente Próximo: el papel de la Unión Europea y la implicación de 
la comunidad internacional en el conflicto" in I. Álvarez-Ossorio (ed.), Informe sobre el conflicto de Palestina. De 
los Acuerdos de Oslo a la Hoja de Ruta, (Madrid: Ediciones del Oriente y el Mediterráneo, 2003) 258.  
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the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties”, as called for by the 
Declaration of the Seville European Council in June 2002. 
 
  The Road map’s main objective was to close the vicious circle of violence that was 
opened after the collapse of peace conversations in Camp David and the activation of the Aqsa 
Intifada. To get out from this impasse, the Road map offered security for Israel by putting an end 
to the Intifada and the suicide operations, on the one hand, and a “political horizon” for the 
Palestinians with the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state in 2005, on 
the other. The significant feature about the Road Map was the active implication of the 
international community as a whole and, specifically, the EU. This question was a prerequisite to 
bring the parties back to negotiations. If the Road map is implemented, the EU could play a 
significant part in helping to verify the implementation of the agreement, supervising security, 
providing possible buffers between Israelis and Palestinians in certain hot spots, facilitating 
movement through checkpoints, supervising the delivery of humanitarian aid, facilitating 
reconstruction and development of infrastructure, and providing assistance in capacity-building 
for democratization.  
 
  Despite the Road Map´s being approved, it soon became obvious that a great share of the 
Road map success depends on the degree of collaboration among the four members of the 
Quartet and on the future evolution of transatlantic political relations. And in particular, it needs 
a close collaboration between the United States and the EU. Iraq’s war was originated in the 
deep differences among the members of the Quartet. However, all the members agree to consider 
that the Middle East conflict is a source of continuous regional instability, and must be resolved 
as soon as possible.  
 
  Both the Azores Summit on March 16, and the European Council in Brussels on March 
20-21, 2003, demanded a more decisive involvement of the international community for the 
resolution of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In this fashion, it is important to learn from the 
errors of the past. It is essential that the eventual Road Map’s implementation brings immediate 
results on the ground, and pays heed to the needs of both sides in the talks. Hence a halt must be 
called to suicide attacks against Israeli targets, but things must also be done to alleviate the 
hardships which the Palestinians are suffering. This means improving their living standards, 
assuring them freedom of movement, lifting curfews and, above all, providing territorial 
continuity between Palestinian zones. Also, the peace process must adhere to international 
resolutions (resolutions 242, 338 and 1 397 of the Security Council) and not establish new terms 
of reference instead (the Oslo Agreements or the Road Map).  
 
  If a new Palestine state is based on the Oslo borders, rather than those in place before the 
Six Day War, the Palestinians will see it as yet another fait accompli designed to perpetuate 
Israeli power over their lands and block the emergence of a truly sovereign and independent 
state. An ill-defined, unworkable Palestinian state without territorial continuity would only add 
to the region’s problems instead of solving them. As in Oslo, the Road Map calendar established 
by the Quartet redounds to the benefit of Israel which, as the occupying power, has the means to  
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alter the status quo by more faits accomplis, and to block any advance in negotiations alleging 
reasons either internal (an unsettled political situation, reasons of state, divided opinions on the 
peace process, violence, terrorism or corruption of the PA...) or external (crisis in Iraq, regional 
instability, the fight against Islamic terrorism...). 
 
  Quartet members and the EU specifically, must strive to ensure that, this time, the 
measures timetabled for each phase are enacted without delaying tactics from either side, and the 
errors of the past are not repeated. Israel, as the occupying power, cannot be allowed to take 
refuge in the “no dates are sacred” argument, or use this as a pretext to continue altering the 
situation of the occupied territories by further colonisation and cantonization.
14 (The UE must 
save the Palestinians from falling hostage to an interminable process of negotiations (it is already 
13 years since the Madrid Conference) which far from raising their living standards and bringing 
them nearer independence, condemn them to poverty and insecurity. 
 
  It is important for the EU to play a more active role in order to prevent an escalation of 
the problem on the spot. As Steven Everts has pointed out.  
 
First, on the diplomatic front, the EU should pressure the US to implement the 
roadmap […]. Second, European governments, together with the US, should 
prepare plans for a NATO-led peacekeeping force to police a final settlement 
[…]: only an external force can compensate for the lack of trust among the parties 
after years of violence […]. Third, the EU should learn to leverage its trade and 
aid policies in support of its political strategy […].In addition to providing 
incentives, the EU should also be ready to use some sticks. For example, it should 
keep a firm line on the question of exports from Israeli settlements. Such exports 
should not be labelled 'made in Israel', and should no longer enter the EU on 
preferential terms. […]. The EU should make its 250 million annual aid to the PA 
conditional on tangible progress towards democracy and good governance.
15 
 
Conclusions 
 
The recognition of a European strategy for the Middle East requires the reconstruction of the 
transatlantic link and cooperation between the EU and the United States. It should not be 
forgotten that “Despite the cultural differences among the 16 countries involved in the EU-US 
relationship, both societies share the ‘Euro-American way of life,’ namely, closely intertwined 
values as well as political and economic principles based on common premises (free markets and 
                     
14 The latest example of such cantonization is the so-called Defensive Wall hurriedly being erected between 
Israel and the occupied territories without any response from the international community, even though it breaches 
the lines of Green Line. 
15 Steven Everts, "How Can Help the Middle East Peace Process", Centre for European Research Bulletin, no. 
28, February- March 2003.  
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political democracy.”
16 Besides, Europeans and Americans agree on the need to fight Islamic 
terrorism, ease Middle-Eastern conflicts, find a way out of the Iraqi maze and guarantee the 
provision of oil at reasonable prices. 
 
  A close transatlantic cooperation is essential to confront these challenges, which not only 
include Islamic terrorism, but also the structural transformation of the Arab world. The approval 
of the Greater Middle East initiative during the G-8 summit held at Sea Island on June 10, 2004, 
may have paved the way for a common approach to reform and development in the Arab world. 
It is important to remark that such initiative draws upon the conclusions reached by the Arab 
Human Development Report of 2002,
17 which reveals the problems endemic to Arab societies 
and outlines the goals to be pursued in the future: 1) full respect for human rights and human 
freedoms as the cornerstones of good governance, leading to human development; 2) the 
complete empowerment of Arab women; 3) the consolidation of knowledge acquisition and its 
effective utilisation. 
 
  Steven Everts praises the progress that has been made, which could be symptomatic of a 
change in transatlantic relations:  
 
"Something of a new consensus has emerged —in Europe, America and across the 
Middle East itself— that ‘Arab state failure’ is not just a political or socio-
economic problem, but also the source of many security threats […]. The US 
deserves huge credit for having kick-started the debate on the democratic deficit. 
But it must also realise that it has a massive image problem in the Middle East. 
Because of the debacle in Iraq and Washington's near-unconditional support for 
Israel, many in the region distrust America's motives and sincerity […]. Europe 
can be of help here. For well-known reasons it evokes more trust than America.” 
For Everts, “a joint transatlantic strategy for promoting democratic reforms could 
have three positive effects. First: it could increase the strategy's chances of 
success by making sure the message comes from a more trusted source. Second, 
the US could learn from Europe's mistakes. Third, a joint strategy, with each side 
playing to its strengths, could have real therapeutic effect on the US-European 
relationship itself. It could be the common project around which to rebuild the 
transatlantic partnership. Although there are many obstacles, a robust transatlantic 
strategy for the greater Middle East is both possible and necessary.”
18 
                     
16 Roberto Domínguez Rivera, "The External Action of the European Union towards the United States: How 
Relevan is the European Union in Constraining or Replacing U.S. Hegemony", The Jean Monnet Chair, University 
of Miami, September 2002. 
17  Arab Human Development Programme 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future Generations, United 
Nations Development Programme / Arab Found for Economic and Social Development, Nueva York, 2002, p. VII. 
18 Steven Everts, "A Joint Strategy to Promote Political Reform in the Middle East", The Jordan Times, June 10 
2004.  
 
 
12
 
 
  Besides seeking greater cooperation with the US, the EU’s strategy for the Middle East 
must also take into account the limitations of the American foreign policy and reach those places 
the American policy proves unable to reach. It is blatant that the creation of a Palestine State can 
further the cause of democratisation throughout the Arab world only if the process itself is 
balanced and global and leads to a fair and lasting peace. As Egyptian thinker Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim has rigthtly pointed out: "Equally important to reinforcing democratization would be 
positive regional developments, especially regarding the Arab-Israeloi conflict. The signing of a 
historic peace accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization is potentially of 
great importance, not only in bringing peace and stability to the region, but also in promoting the 
process of democratization and the development of civil society in the Arab World".
19 
   
                     
19 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview" in R. Brynen, B. 
Korany y P. Nobel (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. Vol. 1. Theorical 
Perspectives, Londres, Lynne Rienner Pub., 1995, p. 53. 